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7.1  Introduction 
There has recently been a marked increase in real economic integration 
among the Asian countries. For example, the share of intraregional trade in the 
total exports of Asia (which excludes Japan) rose from 30.9 percent in 1986 to 
45.7 percent in 1994, while the share of exports to the United States declined 
from 34.0 to 24.5 percent during the same period (Kwan 1995). In the rapidly 
industrializing economies of  Asia,  the share of  Japan is now  considerably 
larger than that of the United States in imports, although not in exports (table 
7.1). Japan is at least equal in importance to the United States as a trading 
partner of most Asian countries. 
Despite the increasing pace of intraregional integration, the declining share 
of the United States in international trade, and the significant status of Japan 
as a trading partner, the exchange rate policies of most East Asian countries 
remain that of  limiting fluctuations in the nominal values of their currencies 
relative to the U.S. dollar in one form or another. Most empirical studies as 
well as casual observation seem to suggest that the U.S. dollar remains strong, 
and the Japanese yen remains marginal, as the anchor of exchange rate policies 
in the region. 
Against this background, the paper will examine the role of  the Japanese 
yen in the exchange rate policies of selected Asian countries,' namely, Korea, 
Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand. This is not a 
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1. In discussing the role of  the yen in Asia, there is also the separate question of how widely the 
yen is used in intraregional transactions. The emphasis of the paper, however, is strictly on the 
importance of the yen in the determination of the nominal values of East Asian currencies. 
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Table 7.1  Import and Export Shares of the United States, Japan, and European Union 
in Selected Asian Countries, 1994 (percent of total) 
Imports  Exports  Total Trade 
Country  U.S.  Japan  EU  U.S.  Japan  EU  U.S.  Japan  EU 
Korea  21.6  25.4  13.0  21.4  14.1  10.6  21.2  19.6  11.7 
Singapore  15.3  22.0  12.1  18.8  7.0  13.0  17.0  14.7  12.5 
Malaysia  16.6  26.7  13.5  21.2  11.9  13.9  18.9  19.4  13.7 
Indonesia  10.1  27.6  18.5  16.8  30.9  16.7  13.8  29.4  17.5 
Philippines  18.5  24.2  10.3  38.5  15.0  17.1  26.0  20.8  12.8 
Thailand  11.3  30.4  14.4  23.2  18.0  15.7  16.5  25.0  15.0 
Source: IMF, Direction of  Trade Statistics Yearbook (Washington, D.C., 1995). 
new topic. The widely cited study by Frankel and Wei (1994), for example, has 
examined this very issue by econometrically estimating the implicit weights of 
the U.S. dollar and the Japanese yen in the determination of the nominal values 
of major Asian currencies. The present study is meant to complement the em- 
pirical findings obtained from the econometric approach by taking the alterna- 
tive approach of observing currency movements when the Japanese yen fluc- 
tuates sharply in one direction against the US.  dollar. 
To be sure, the monetary authorities of Asian countries must assign different 
weights to variables that may enter the objective functions of their exchange 
rate policies, such as price stability, stability of nominal effective exchange rate 
indexes, stability of real effective exchange rate indexes, encouragement or 
discouragement of capital flows, accumulation of foreign exchange reserves, 
and export promotion. Thus the role of the yen in the exchange rate policy of 
a given country cannot be independent of  the domestic and international en- 
vironments within which the authorities are forced to operate. In this context, 
it is important to bear in mind that during the past  15 years or so,  the yen 
significantly appreciated against the U.S. dollar in both nominal and real terms 
(table 7.2). In this environment, the decision to minimize fluctuations against 
the yen would have meant that the authorities must accept some appreciation 
of their currency against the U.S. dollar and other Asian currencies. 
If a large weight is given to export promotion in the objective function of 
the authorities, they may have been reluctant to tie their currency too closely 
to the appreciating yen, to the extent that nominal currency appreciation may 
work to reduce the growth of exports in the short run. Thus, ex post, the cur- 
rency in question must have moved closely with the U.S. dollar and depreciated 
against the yen, such that its relationship with the yen may be characterized as 
“competitive” in that, relative to the yen, exchange rate stability was willingly 
sacrificed in favor of depreciation to preserve competitiveness. 
On the other hand, if a large weight is given to price stability,  the authorities 
may have been less willing to tolerate nominal depreciation and hence higher 
domestic inflation, by  tying the currency too closely to the U.S. dollar. This Table 7.2  Nominal and Real Exchange Rates of the Japanese Yen against the U.S. Dollar and Selected Asian Currencies, 1980-95 
(annual averages, 1990 = 100) 
United States  Korea  Singapore  Malaysia  Indonesia  Philippines  Thailand 
Year  Nominal  Real  Nominal 
1980  63.9  91.5  54.8 
1981  65.7  87.5  63.2 
1982  58.1  77.3  60.0 
1983  61.0  78.3  66.8 
1984  61.0  76.3  69.4 
1985  60.7  75.5  74.6 
1986  85.9  99.9  107.0 
1987  101.1  109.3  116.3 
1988  113.0  117.3  116.8 
1989  105.0  106.5  99.6 
1990  100.0  100.0  100.0 
1991  107.5  107.5  111.4 
1992  114.3  112.0  126.1 
1993  130.2  120.9  147.7 
1994  141.7  127.2  160.8 


















Nominal  Real  Nominal 
75.4  72.8  51.4 
76.5  72.1  55.9 
68.6  68.7  50.2 
71.1  72.2  52.3 
71.7  73.2  52.8 
73.7  76.0  55.7 
103.2  113.9  82.0 
116.3  115.0  93.2 
125.4  125.1  109.4 
112.9  112.6  105.1 
100.0  100.0  100.0 
102.4  107.0  109.3 
102.7  110.6  107.7 
116.1  125.7  123.9 
119.4  127.2  137.4 
120.4  127.0  142.5 
Real  Nominal 
n.a.  21.7 
n.a.  22.5 
n.a.  20.9 
n.a.  30.1 
63.1  33.9 
67.2  36.6 
95.8  59.8 
101.1  89.3 
109.4  103.4 
103.9  100.8 
100.0  100.0 
105.3  113.8 
101.0  125.9 
110.3  147.5 
114.2  166.1 
111.3  187.8 
Real  Nominal 
63.0  19.7 
60.2  21.3 
52.5  20.4 
61.8  27.9 
61.5  41.9 
62.8  46.5 
86.0  72.0 
107.4  84.7 
111.5  98.0 
104.5  93.8 
100.0  100.0 
106.1  121.5 
109.1  120.0 
114.9  145.3 
114.8  153.9 


















Nominal  Real 
73.3  109.6 
78.3  108.4 
66.4  92.8 
67.1  89.8 
66.7  91.9 
64.9  88.4 
78.0  97.0 
97.7  110.4 
108.2  111.9 
103.2  104.6 
100.0  100.0 
103.1  96.7 
104.8  96.7 
114.2  101.8 
123.7  103.8 
134.5  103.5 
Source: IMF, Infernational Financial Statistics (Washington, D.C., various issues); author’s estimates. 
Nofe:  Bilateral real exchange rate indexes are based on wholesale prices; an increase in the index means an appreciation of the yen against the currency of the country con- 
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may  be a particularly pertinent consideration, given the significant share of 
Japanese goods in total imports. In this case, ex post, the currency in question 
must have moved with the yen  and appreciated against the U.S. dollar to a 
greater extent, and its relationship with the yen may be regarded as “coopera- 
tive,” in that such behavior has tended to contribute to monetary cooperation 
in Asia by promoting greater exchange rate stability in the environment of sec- 
ular yen appreciation. 
Occasionally, however, the yen did depreciate against the U.S. dollar on a 
sustained basis. On  such occasions, the considerations of  export promotion 
and price stability would have created exactly the opposite kind of reaction to 
the yen’s fluctuation on the part of the monetary authorities. With greater em- 
phasis on export promotion, the authorities would have been more willing to 
allow the currency concerned to depreciate along with the yen against the U.S. 
dollar. With more emphasis on price stability, they would have been more un- 
willing to allow the currency to depreciate along with the yen. Thus, in the 
case of yen depreciation, export promotion would have encouraged greater ex- 
change rate stability within Asia. However, throughout this paper, emphasis on 
price stability is regarded as “cooperative” behavior because, for the period 
taken as a whole, it has contributed more to promoting exchange rate stability 
within Asia. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 7.2 reviews the ex- 
change rate arrangements of the six Asian countries, with some comments on 
the nominal and real exchange rate movements. Section 7.3 summarizes the 
econometric estimates of the implicit weights of the U.S. dollar and the Japa- 
nese yen in the determination of the nominal values of the currencies of the six 
Asian countries, as reported by Frankel and Wei (1994) and the more recent 
study of Kwan (1995). Section 7.4 provides additional insight into the relative 
weights of  the U.S. dollar and the Japanese yen  in the determination of  the 
values of the six Asian currencies by looking at how they move when the yen 
fluctuates sharply against the dollar. Sections 7.5  and 7.6 take a look at the 
daily movements of the six Asian currencies during the periods of sharp yen 
appreciation and depreciation in the late 1980s and in  1995, respectively, in 
order to assess the response of the monetary authorities when the yen fluctuates 
sharply against the U.S. dollar. Section 7.7 presents concluding remarks. 
7.2  An Overview of Exchange Rate Arrangements and 
Movements of Selected Asian Countries 
At the outset, it may be useful to review briefly the exchange rate arrange- 
ments of the six individual countries. According to official statements, Korea, 
Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia are classified as maintaining “other man- 
aged floating” rates, while Thailand maintains a peg to a currency composite, 
or a currency basket (International Monetary Fund [IMF] 1994). Of the six 
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rate system. In practice, however, Indonesia and the Philippines are similar in 
that the rupiah and the peso are both managed tightly in terms of their U.S. 
dollar exchange rates over a short time horizon, while they have shown sig- 
nificant trend depreciation over a longer horizon (table 7.2); their exchange rate 
systems may more appropriately be classified as crawling pegs to the dollar. 
Consistent with the crawling peg arrangement, both the Indonesian rupiah 
and the Philippine peso depreciated significantly against the U.S. dollar in 
nominal terms over the period 1980-95:  the rupiah depreciated from 627 to 
2,249 units per U.S. dollar, and the peso moved from 7.51 to 25.71 units per 
U.S. dollar, both on an annual average basis. In contrast, the other currencies 
showed relative stability against the U.S. dollar over this period. The Korean 
won first depreciated from 607.43 to 88  1.45 units per U.S. dollar between 1980 
and 1986 but then appreciated to 671.46 units per U.S. dollar in 1989. The 
Singapore dollar showed a fairly steady appreciation against the U.S. dollar, 
rising from 2.14 to  1.42 units per U.S. dollar between  1980 and  1995. The 
Malaysian ringgit and the Thai baht depreciated at a modest pace against the 
U.S. dollar, with the ringgit falling from 2.18 to 2.50 units per US.  dollar and 
the baht from 20.48 to 24.80 units per U.S. dollar over the period. 
In real bilateral terms (on a wholesale price basis), the Korean won, the 
Singapore dollar, the Malaysian ringgit, and the Indonesian rupiah generally 
depreciated against both the U.S. dollar and the Japanese yen over the period, 
although they became much more stable during the latter part of  the period 
(table 7.2). The Philippine peso, in contrast, appreciated in real terms against 
the U.S. dollar, although it depreciated against the Japanese yen over the pe- 
riod. Reflecting the higher rate of inflation, it even appreciated against the Jap- 
anese yen from 1988 to 1990 despite the significant nominal depreciation. Fi- 
nally, the Thai baht appreciated against both the U.S. dollar and the Japanese 
yen over the period. 
7.2.1  Korea 
From February 1980 to March 1990, the won was officially linked to a bas- 
ket of currencies, although it was effectively pegged to the U.S. dollar. On 2 
March 1990, however, the Korean authorities adopted the “market  average 
rate” (MAR) system, by  which the dollar exchange rate is in principle deter- 
mined by  supply and demand conditions in the market, subject to a type of 
daily price limit. The Bank of Korea sets the won-dollar rate on the basis of a 
weighted average of interbank rates for spot transactions of the previous day. 
On each business day, the won-dollar exchange rate in the interbank market is 
allowed to fluctuate within fixed margins (currently, 1 percent on either side) 
against the MAR of the previous day. 
The real exchange rates of the Korean won against the U.S. dollar and the 
Japanese yen closely followed the nominal exchange rates because the rate of 
inflation only slightly exceeded those in the United States and Japan. Over the 
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the Japanese yen, naturally with the extent of depreciation against the yen be- 
ing much more significant. From  1990 to  1994, although the won remained 
relatively stable against the dollar, it depreciated by  as much as 34 percent 
against the yen. From 1994 to 1995, however, it marginally appreciated against 
the yen. 
7.2.2  Singapore 
The Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) “monitors the external value 
of the Singapore dollar against a trade-weighted basket of currencies, with the 
objective of  promoting noninflationary sustainable economic growth” (IMF 
1994). In Singapore, the central bank functions are performed by  the Board 
of Commissioners of Currency (currency board) and the MAS. The currency 
board issues and redeems currency notes and coins, as demanded and backed 
by foreign assets. The MAS intervenes in the foreign exchange market when- 
ever the exchange rate is out of line with the undisclosed target, which may 
well be changed from time to time. Given the openness and the small size of 
the economy, price stability is paramount as an objective of exchange rate pol- 
icy (Toh 1996).’ 
In real terms, the Singapore dollar depreciated against both the U.S. dollar 
and the Japanese yen over the entire period 1980-95. From 1986 to 1990, how- 
ever, the Singapore dollar appreciated against both currencies. From 1990 to 
1994, it depreciated against the yen by almost 30 percent, while it remained 
stable against the U.S. dollar; from 1994 to 1995, it marginally appreciated 
against the yen. Judging from the behavior of the real exchange rate, it appears 
that, from about 1986, price stability became a particularly important objective 
of Singapore’s exchange rate policy. 
7.2.3  Malaysia 
From September 1975, the value of the ringgit has been determined by sup- 
ply and demand conditions in the foreign exchange market by  Bank Nagara 
Malaysia with reference to the value determined by  a basket of currencies of 
the country’s major trading partners (Ong 1996).  According to the IMF (1994), 
the central bank is said to intervene “only to maintain orderly market condi- 
tions and to avoid excessive fluctuations in the value of the ringgit.” 
In real terms, the ringgit depreciated against both the U.S. dollar and the 
Japanese yen over the entire sample period. The depreciation was particularly 
substantial against the yen. From 1990, however, the ringgit began to appreci- 
ate moderately against the U.S. dollar, in line with its nominal appreciation. 
However, it continued to depreciate against the yen until 1994, at which time 
it began to appreciate somewhat. 
2. The term “low and stable domestic inflation” appeared as the official objective of Singapore’s 
exchange rate policy for the first time in the  1989 issue of the  IMFs  annual report Exchange 
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7.2.4  Indonesia 
With the devaluation of the rupiah in November 1978, the link with the U.S. 
dollar was discontinued, and the middle rate of the rupiah began to be deter- 
mined by the value of a basket of currencies and other considerations, subject 
to periodic devaluations. Following the 45 percent devaluation of  September 
1986, however, Bank Indonesia launched the exchange rate policy of  main- 
taining the real effective exchange rate at a stable level in order to maintain 
Indonesia’s competitiveness in the light of higher domestic inflation relative to 
its major trading partners (Goelton 1996).  From 1986 to 1994, the rupiah thus 
depreciated at a rate of roughly 5 percent against the U.S. dollar per year in 
nominal terms. 
Bank Indonesia continues to set the middle or reference rate of the rupiah 
in terms of the U.S. dollar by taking into account the behavior of  a basket of 
currencies of Indonesia’s major trading partners. In September 1994, however, 
Bank Indonesia ceased to announce the middle rate and at the same time began 
to widen the intervention band around the middle rate in order to increase the 
risk of  speculation in the rupiah. Currently, the intervention band is approxi- 
mately 3 percent on either side of the now undisclosed reference rate against 
the U.S. dollar. 
Although the Indonesian rupiah depreciated against both the U.S. dollar and 
the Japanese yen over the entire period in real terms, it remained much more 
stable after 1986, in line with the stated objective of the exchange rate policy. 
In fact, it appreciated in real terms against the U.S. dollar by about 20 percent 
from 1990 to 1995, while it depreciated against the yen by about 13 percent, 
indicating that the Indonesian authorities are concerned about the stability of 
the real effective exchange rate of the rupiah, in which the yen must have sig- 
nificant weight. 
7.2.5  Philippines 
Prior to October 1984, the central bank had intervened to keep the peso- 
dollar exchange rate within a certain target range. Since then, the value of the 
peso has in principle been determined freely in the foreign exchange market, 
though it is apparent that the central bank controls short-run fluctuations in the 
exchange rate. With the major liberalization  of the foreign exchange market in 
1992, there is presumably a greater role of market forces in the determination 
of the exchange rate (Cororaton 1996). 
Reflecting the much higher and variable rate of inflation in the Philippines 
as well as the frequency of changes in the target dollar exchange rate, the real 
exchange rate of the Philippine peso fluctuated greatly against the U.S. dollar 
and the Japanese yen. From 1990  to 1995, the peso depreciated against the yen 
by  over 14 percent, while it appreciated against the U.S. dollar by  nearly 18 
percent in real terms. It is possible that, to the extent that the Philippine author- 
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in real terms, they are paying some attention to the real efsective exchange rate, 
in which the yen has significant weight. 
7.2.6  Thailand 
The Thai baht was de fact0 pegged to the U.S. dollar from 1981 to Novem- 
ber 1984, when it was devalued by  14.7 percent. The baht was subsequently 
pegged to a weighted basket of currencies of Thailand's major trading partners. 
The basket is not disclosed, nor is the frequency with which the basket is 
changed. It is believed, however, that the weight of the U.S. dollar was raised 
from about 50 percent to over 80 percent when the U.S. dollar began to depre- 
ciate sharply against major currencies from late 1985 (Leeahtam 1991). 
In the morning of every business day, the Bank of Thailand announces the 
central rates of major currencies against the baht. For the U.S. dollar, the buy- 
ing and selling rates are two satang below and above the central rate. In a recent 
meeting of the Exchange Equalization Fund, however, the governor of  the 
Bank of Thailand is reported to have announced the possibility of widening the 
band from the current two satang to four satang on either side of the central 
rate, in order to discourage short-term speculative capital inflows by increasing 
the cost of investing in the baht (Phatra Research Institute 1996). 
In real terms, the Thai baht remained fairly stable against the U.S. dollar 
from 1980  to 1985,  but it began to appreciate sharply from 1985, when the yen 
began to appreciate against the U.S. dollar. In contrast, while the baht appreci- 
ated against the yen during the earlier period in real terms (reflective of  the 
fact that it was pegged to the appreciating dollar), it remained fairly stable 
against the yen  in real terms from 1986 to 1995. As a result, from 1990 to 
1995, the baht appreciated against the U.S. dollar by nearly 30 percent. 
7.3  Implicit Weights of the U.S. Dollar and the Japanese Yen: 
A Review of Frankel and Wei (1994) and Kwan (1995) 
The widely cited study by Frankel and Wei (1994) was the first to estimate 
econometrically the implicit weights of  the U.S. dollar and the Japanese yen 
in the determination of  the nominal values of major Asian currencies during 
the period 1979-92.  This study was replicated by Kwan (1995) on the basis of 
more recent data. Their major findings, summarized in table 7.3, seem to show 
that the dominant weight is given to the U.S. dollar in the determination of all 
six Asian currencies studied here.3 
According to Frankel and Wei, however, the weight of  the yen, although 
small, was significant in the Singapore dollar and became larger in the Malay- 
sian ringgit and the Thai baht during the latest subperiod of  1991-92  (not re- 
ported in the table). The recently increased weight of the yen is reported by 
3. The reported weights do not necessarily add up to unity because there may be other currencies 
or variables included in the estimation equations, sometimes with negative weights. Table 7.3  Implicit Weights of the U.S. Dollar and Japanese Yen in Nominal Values of Selected Asian Currencies 
Kwan 
Frankel and Wei 
January 1979-May  1992 (weekly)  January 1991-May  1995 (monthly)  January-August  1995 (weekly) 
Japanese Yen  Currency  US.  Dollar  Japanese Yen  U.S. Dollar  Japanese Yen  U.S. Dollar 
Korean won  0.96  -0.01  0.9435  0.0623  0.8374  0.1737 
Singapore dollar  0.75  0.13  0.6897  0.1052  0.7459  0.1835 
Malaysian ringgit  0.78  0.07  0.8411  0.0431  0.8728  0.1561 
Indonesian rupiah  0.95  0.16  0.9896  -0.0005  0.9682  0.0102 
Philippine peso  1.07  -0.01  1.1464  -0.2359  1.0672  0.0252 
Thai baht  0.91  0.05  0.8202  0.1051  0.8593  0.0883 
Sources: Frankel and Wei (1994) and Kwan (1995). 194  Shinji Takagi 
Kwan for the Korean won, the Singapore dollar, the Malaysian ringgit, and the 
Thai baht. 
7.3.1  Korea 
According to the estimates of Frankel and Wei based on weekly data for the 
period January 1979-May  1992, the share of the U.S. dollar in the determina- 
tion of the Korean won was 0.96 while the share of the Japanese yen was practi- 
cally zero. In fact, they show that the Korean won remained linked more or 
less to the U.S. dollar even after the introduction of the MAR system in March 
1990.  This finding is confirmed for the later period of January 1991-May  1995 
by  Kwan on the basis of  monthly data. However, Kwan reports that for the 
most recent subperiod of January-August  1995, the weight of the dollar de- 
clined to 0.8374, while that of the yen increased to 0.1737. 
7.3.2  Singapore 
According to Frankel and Wei, the Singapore dollar was the only Asian cur- 
rency that consistently assigned weight to the yen throughout the entire period 
1979-92. The weight of  the dollar was 0.75, while that of the yen was 0.13, 
when the weights were calculated for the entire sample. They also show that 
the weight of the yen doubled in the 1980s from around 5 percent to 10  percent, 
or from 10 percent to 20 percent, depending on the method of estimation (not 
reported in the table). For the most recent period, Kwan reports that the weight 
of the U.S. dollar was 0.7459, while that of the yen was 0.1835. 
7.3.3  Malaysia 
According to Frankel and Wei, the weight of the yen in the Malaysian ringgit 
was extremely small in the early 1980s, and even disappeared during the rest 
of the 1980s,  but increased to about 14 percent in the early 1990s (not reported 
in the table). For the entire period, the weight of the yen was 0.07, while that 
of the dollar was 0.78. For the later subperiod January 1991-May  1995, how- 
ever, Kwan  assigns virtually zero weight to the yen (0.0431), while greater 
weight is given to the U.S. dollar (0.8411).  For the most recent subperiod Janu- 
ary-August  1995, the yen’s weight rose to 0.1561, while the share of the U.S. 
dollar was 0.8728. 
7.3.4  Indonesia 
Frankel and Wei report that although the Indonesian rupiah remained tightly 
pegged to the U.S. dollar until 1982, the dollar peg became looser in  1983. In 
1985, the yen received significant weight, so much so that the weight exceeded 
that of the U.S. dollar for the period 1985-86  (not reported in the table). Subse- 
quently, however, the weight of the yen declined, disappearing altogether dur- 
ing the latest subperiod 1991-92  (not reported in the table). For the entire 
sample period, the weights of the U.S. dollar and the Japanese yen were esti- 
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more recent years is confirmed by Kwan for the subperiod January 1991-May 
1995 as well as for the subperiod January-August  1995. 
7.3.5  Philippines 
Although the peso depreciated significantly against the U.S. dollar through- 
out the period in nominal terms, the estimated weight of the U.S.  dollar (about 
unity) indicates that the peso was closely linked to the U.S. dollar. This sug- 
gests that although the peso was devalued from time to time, its fluctuations 
against the U.S. dollar were strictly managed over shorter intervals. 
7.3.6  Thailand 
Until 1984, the Thai baht was de facto linked to the U.S. dollar, so that the 
yen received no weight prior to that year. When the baht was delinked from the 
dollar, however, the yen began to receive some weight: according to Frankel 
and Wei, in the neighborhood of 10 percent during 1985-86 when the nominal 
value of the U.S. dollar was at its peak (not reported in the table). The weight 
of the yen became smaller during 1987-90  but rose again to 12 percent during 
the latest subperiod 1991-92  (not reported in the table). For the entire sample, 
the weights of the U.S. dollar and the Japanese yen were 0.91 and 0.05, respec- 
tively. For the more recent subperiod January 1991-May  1995, Kwan reports 
0.8202 and 0.1051 as the weights of the U.S. dollar and the yen, respectively. 
7.4  Movements of Asian Currencies When the Yen 
Fluctuates Sharply against the U.S. Dollar 
While econometric estimation of the implicit weights of the U.S. dollar and 
the Japanese yen is useful in revealing the relative covariances of the currency 
in question with the U.S.  dollar and the Japanese yen during a particular sample 
period, it can yield misleading interpretations unless proper caution is exer- 
cised. Most important, it must be borne in mind that the econometric approach 
stresses the covariances between the currency in question and the currencies 
included in the currency basket without much regard to the magnitude of the 
underlying changes in currency values. This point is important even if the cur- 
rency in question is strictly pegged to a currency basket (Thailand) and the 
composition of the basket remains unchanged, as long as a fluctuation margin 
is provided around the central rate (Takagi 1988). Naturally, the problem be- 
comes greater in the case of  a managed float of  more discretionary nature 
(Korea, Singapore, and Malaysia). 
To understand this point, assume, for example, that the authorities of a coun- 
try care deeply about the nominal stability of the currency against the Japanese 
yen and hence assign a weight of  10 percent to the yen in the currency basket. 
If the yen is relatively stable against the U.S. dollar, however, stability against 
the yen can be secured by simply pegging the currency to the U.S. dollar, pre- 
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the prescribed margins around the theoretical rate. Thus the estimated weight 
of the yen may turn out to be zero. 
On the other hand, if the yen sharply fluctuates against the U.S. dollar in one 
direction, the policy of pegging the currency to the dollar will result in a sharp 
movement of the currency against the Japanese yen and may lead to a situation 
where the market rate goes out of the prescribed margins unless the market 
rate is changed in line with the weight of the yen in the country’s exchange rate 
policy. The authorities will likely change the dollar rate so as to offset part 
of the fluctuation of the currency against the yen. In this case, the estimated 
weight of the yen may approach the theoretical value of 10 percent, or even 
higher if the maximum margin on both sides is utilized. 
Thus, in order to assess the role of  the Japanese yen in the exchange rate 
policies of the Asian countries, it is important not only to look at the economet- 
ric estimates of the weights of the dollar and the yen over some sample period 
but also to examine how the currencies move vis-&,is  the dollar and the yen 
when the yen  fluctuates sharply in one direction against the U.S. dollar. For 
this purpose, we will next consider twelve episodes of large yen appreciation 
or depreciation (of at least 5 percent) against the U.S. dollar. There were eight 
episodes of yen appreciation and four episodes of yen depreciation. Table 7.4 
shows how much the Japanese yen and the other Asian currencies appreciated 
(when the figures are positive) or depreciated (when negative) against the U.S. 
dollar during each of these twelve episodes. 
The numbers in parentheses indicate the direction of change of each Asian 
currency as a percentage of the movement of the Japanese yen, which can be 
roughly interpreted as the weight of the yen during that epi~ode.~  For example, 
a negative number in parentheses means that the movement of the yen and the 
movement of the currency in question go in opposite directions relative to the 
U.S. dollar; a figure of 20, for example, means that the magnitude of the move- 
ment of  the currency in question is 20 percent of  the movement of  the yen 
against the U.S. dollar. 
7.4.1  Korea 
When the episodes of yen appreciation or depreciation during 1982-95  are 
individually examined, we find that when the yen depreciated, the won depreci- 
ated against the U.S. dollar three out of four times. In these cases of yen depre- 
ciation, the weight of the yen ranged between 6 and 43 percent. On the other 
hand, when the yen appreciated against the U.S. dollar, there were times when 
the won even depreciated against the U.S. dollar. During the appreciation of 
4.  Admittedly, this is a crude measure of  the weight of  the yen because there can be other 
currencies whose movements are being considered by the authorities. This measure is simply to 
be taken as a rough indication of how closely the currency in question moved with the yen ex post, 
relative to the U.S. dollar. As another qualification, it should also be noted that this measure may 
underestimate the “weight” of the yen if the currency in question moves with the yen with a longer 
lag (Cho 1996). Table 7.4  Movements of  Selected Asian Currencies against the U.S.  Dollar during Periods of Sharp  Yen-Dollar Exchange Rate Change 
Period 
Japanese  Korean  Singapore  Malaysian  Indonesian  Philippine  Thai 
Yen  Won  Dollar  Ringgit  Rupiah  Peso  Baht 
1. October 1982 to March 1984  21.0  -6.1  5.7  2.7  -38.4  -46.1  0.0 
2. March 1984 to February 1985  -  14.4  -6.2  -8.0  -11.9  -8.8  -27.1  -19.9 
(-29)  (27)  (13)  (-183)  (-219)  (0) 
(43)  (55)  (83)  (61)  (188)  (138) 
3. August 1985 to September 1986  43.5  1.1  4.5  -5.6  -37.8  -9.5  3.0 
(2.6)  (10)  (- 13)  (-87)  ( -  22)  (6.8) 
4. November 1986 to April 1987  15.2  3.6  3.5  4.9  0.6  -0.2  2.6 
(24)  (23)  (32)  (3.6)  (-1.5)  (17) 
5. September 1989 to April 1990  -  13.5  -5.4  4.4  -1.1  -2.6  -3.8  -0.9 
(40)  ( -  32)  (8.0)  (19)  (29)  (6.3) 
6. June 1990 to October 1990  16.7  0.3  7.6  0.4  -1.5  -10.1  2.8 
(1.8)  (46)  (2.2)  (-9.0)  (-61)  (16) 
7. September 1991 to December 1991  5.9  -2.6  3.6  0.7  -0.5  1.3  -0.2 
8. April 1992 to September 1992  11.3  -  1.0  3.9  1.2  -0.8  2.7  2.1 
(-8.8)  (34)  (11)  (-7.0)  (24)  (19) 
(- 14)  (13)  (14)  (-11)  (-62)  (7.7) 
(-0.5)  (2.0)  (82)  (5.4)  (-17)  (21) 
(21)  (42)  (31)  (-20)  (24)  (12) 
(6.5)  (0.6)  (10)  (10)  (- 6.2)  (11) 
(-43)  (60)  (11)  (-7.7)  (22)  (-2.7) 
9. December 1992 to August 1993  18.0  -2.5  2.4  2.5  -  1.9  -11.1  1.4 
10. August 1993 to December 1993  -7.1  0.04  -0.1  -5.8  -0.4  1.2  -1.5 
1  I. December 1993 to May 1995  29.6  6.1  12.5  9.1  -5.8  7.1  3.6 
12. May 1995 to September 1995  -  16.7  -1.1  -0.1  -1.7  -1.7  1  .o  -  1.8 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics (Washington, D.C., various issues). 
Note: On  the basis of end-of-month data; a positive number means an appreciation  of the currency in question against the U.S.  dollar. Numbers in parentheses  indicate 
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the yen  in December 1993-May  1995, however, the won  also appreciated 
against the U.S. dollar, with the implicit weight of the yen in the determination 
of the won corresponding to 21 percent. 
7.4.2  Singapore 
When the currency value of the yen changed sharply against the U.S. dollar, 
the weight of the yen in the determination of the Singapore dollar was consis- 
tently significant throughout the period, with the weight ranging between 10 
and 55 percent. However, there were two exceptions: the Singapore dollar ap- 
preciated against the U.S. dollar by  4 percent during September 1989-April 
1990, when the yen depreciated by  13 percent; and it remained stable against 
the U.S.  dollar during May-September  1995, when the yen depreciated by al- 
most 17 percent. 
7.4.3  Malaysia 
In terms of individual episodes, the weight of the yen in the determination 
of  the ringgit became consistently significant after the episode of November 
1986-April  1987. The weight ranged between 8 and 32 percent. 
7.4.4  Indonesia 
The yen even had a negative weight during August 1985-September  1986, 
meaning that the rupiah depreciated against the U.S. dollar when the yen sig- 
nificantly appreciated against the U.S. dollar. The rupiah generally depreciated 
against the U.S. dollar whenever the yen depreciated against the U.S. dollar. 
The weight of the yen for the most recent episode (May-September  1995) was 
about 10 percent, but this may simply reflect the fact that the yen depreciated 
against the U.S. dollar when there was a trend depreciation of the rupiah. 
7.4.5  Philippines 
Consistent with the fact that the peso depreciated against the U.S. dollar in 
nominal terms during this period, the yen and the peso generally moved in the 
same direction only when the yen depreciated against the U.S. dollar. The im- 
plicit weight of the yen becomes larger when the magnitude of the yen’s move- 
ment against the U.S. dollar is small. On the other hand, the implicit weight 
becomes small (or negative) when the yen’s  movement against the dollar is 
large, indicating that the yen plays little role in the peso’s nominal exchange 
rate determination. 
7.4.6  Thailand 
When the individual episodes are considered, it becomes clear that the 
weight of the yen in the determination of the baht was between 7 and 19 per- 
cent during 1985-95.  The order of magnitude of these implied weights is simi- 
lar to the econometrically estimated weights. Together with the fact that the 
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depreciation, this seems to suggest that the Thai baht is pegged fairly strictly 
to a basket of currencies, in which the weight of the yen is stable. 
7.5  Daily Movements of Asian Currencies during Periods of  Sharp 
Yen Appreciation and Depreciation in the 1980s 
In the first half of the 1980s, the yen-dollar exchange rate fluctuated in the 
range of  200-270  yen  per dollar, with the yen  showing general weakening 
against the dollar from the middle of  1984 through the early part of  1985. 
Following the Plaza Agreement of 22 September 1985, however, the yen began 
to appreciate sharply from the pre-Plaza level of around 240 to reach the level 
of almost 200 yen per dollar in two months. The appreciation of the yen, from 
19 September to 25 November, amounted to almost 20 percent. The yen contin- 
ued its trend appreciation throughout the rest of the 1980s, except for one no- 
table period of  substantial reversal from the latter part of  1988 through the 
first part of  1989. Somewhat more gradually than on other occasions, the yen 
depreciated from the high of 120.9 yen per dollar on 24 November 1988 to the 
low of  149.6 yen  per dollar on  15 June  1989, a depreciation of  almost 20 
percent. 
This section will take a detailed look at the daily movements of the Japanese 
yen and the Asian currencies against the U.S.  dollar during the period immedi- 
ately following the Plaza Agreement of  1985 (fig. 7.1) and  it portion of the 
latter period of  yen  depreciation, namely, from 3 January to  14 June  1989 
(fig. 7.2).5 
7.5.1  Korea 
During the first period when the yen was appreciating against the U.S.  dollar, 
the Korean won remained virtually pegged to the dollar. During the second 
period of sharp yen depreciation, the won moderately appreciated against the 
dollar. In neither period is there evidence to suggest that the Korean authorities 
were paying much attention to the movement of the won against the yen. 
7.5.2  Singapore 
During the first period of sharp yen appreciation, the Singaporean authori- 
ties allowed the Singapore dollar to appreciate along with the yen against the 
U.S. dollar. The cumulative appreciation of the Singapore dollar over this pe- 
riod was almost 5 percent, as opposed to almost 20 percent for the yen. In 
contrast, when the yen  depreciated in the early part of  1989, the Singapore 
dollar remained stable against the U.S. dollar, underscoring the importance the 
Singaporean authorities attach to price stability. 
5. Daily exchange rate data were obtained from the Asian Wall Street Journal. Exchange rates 
for 1985 are mid rates at 5 P.M. in Hong Kong, while those for 1989 are selling rates at 3 P.M. in 
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Fig. 7.1  Daily movements of selected Asian currencies against the U.S. dollar 
during the period of sharp yen appreciation 19 September to 25 November 1985 
Nore: A, Korean won, Singapore dollar, and Malaysian ringgit. B, Indonesian rupiah, Philippine 
peso, and Thai baht. Logarithmic change in basis points. 
7.5.3  Malaysia 
During the period of yen appreciation, the Malaysian authorities allowed the 
ringgit to appreciate moderately along with the yen against the U.S. dollar. In 
contrast, during the time of  yen depreciation, the ringgit initially depreciated 
somewhat but subsequently appreciated marginally. On  both occasions, the 
movement of the ringgit was similar to that of the Singapore dollar. 
7.5.4  Indonesia 
On the first occasion of  yen  appreciation, the Indonesian rupiah remained 
stable against the U.S. dollar, indicating that the rupiah was effectively pegged 201  The Yen and Its East Asian Neighbors, 1980-1995 
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Fig. 7.2  Daily movements of selected Asian currencies against the U.S. dollar 
during the period of sharp yen depreciation 3 January to 14 June 1989 
Note: A, Korean won, Singapore dollar, and Malaysian ringgit. B, Indonesian rupiah, Philippine 
peso, and Thai baht. Logarithmic change in basis points. 
to the U.S. dollar over this interval. When the yen depreciated in 1989, how- 
ever, the rupiah moderately depreciated. 
7.5.5  Philippines 
dollar. 
On both occasions, the Philippine peso was virtually pegged to the U.S. 
7.5.6  Thailand 
When the yen appreciated, the Thai authorities allowed the baht to appreci- 
ate moderately along with the yen against the U.S.  dollar; when the yen depre- 202  Shinji Takagi 
ciated, they depreciated the baht slightly along with the yen against the U.S. 
dollar. From these two episodes, it appears that the Thai authorities strictly 
adhered to a basket peg and that the weight of the yen in the currency basket 
was reduced somewhat somewhere between 1985 and 1987, presumably in the 
light of the appreciating trend of the yen. 
7.6  Daily Movements of Asian Currencies during Periods of 
Sharp Yen Appreciation and Depreciation in 1995 
In  1995, the Japanese yen  moved sharply against the U.S. dollar on two 
occasions. On the first of these occasions, from 1 March to 19 April, the yen 
appreciated against the U.S. dollar by  over  15 percent, rising from 96.75 to 
81.08 yen per U.S. dollar (fig. 7.3). On the second occasion, from 1 August to 
19 September, the yen reversed its position against the U.S. dollar by depreciat- 
ing by  more than  15 percent, declining from 88.29 to 104.20 yen  per U.S. 
dollar (fig. 7.4).6  These two periods may be instructive in revealing not only 
the reactions of the monetary authorities but also how they might have changed 
since the 1980s. 
7.6.1  Korea 
When the yen fluctuated sharply against the U.S. dollar in either direction, 
the Korean authorities initially kept the won-dollar exchange rate stable. It 
appears that a substantial adjustment of  the won-dollar exchange rate takes 
place only after it is determined that the movement of the yen against the dollar 
is significant and more or less permanent. It is interesting to note that when 
the yen  sharply depreciated against the dollar from  14 to  17 August (by as 
much as 5 percent in three days), the Korean authorities immediately reacted 
by  depreciating the won  (from 761.75 won per U.S. dollar on  15 August to 
787.65 won on 18 August), indicating the greater weight they assign to a depre- 
ciating yen. It is clear that the depreciation of the Korean won in August 1995 
was deliberate as the balance of foreign exchange reserves was increasing dur- 
ing this period. 
7.6.2  Singapore 
When the yen  appreciated, the Singaporean authorities allowed the Singa- 
pore dollar to appreciate moderately along with the yen against the U.S. dollar. 
When the yen depreciated, however, the authorities kept the nominal value of 
the Singapore dollar virtually constant against the U.S. dollar for two full busi- 
ness weeks before allowing the Singapore dollar to depreciate moderately in 
response to a further depreciation of the yen. This may reflect the importance 
6. Daily exchange rate data, except for the Indonesian rupiah, were obtained from the Financial 
Times.  The exchange rates are closing mid rates in London. Daily data for the rupiah were obtained 
from the Wall Streef Journal. The exchange rates are selling rates at 3 P.M. in New York. 203  The Yen  and Its East Asian Neighbors, 1980-1995 
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Fig. 7.3  Daily movements of selected Asian currencies against the U.S. dollar 
during the period of sharp yen appreciation 1 March to 19 April 1995 
Note: A, Korean won,  Singapore dollar, and Malaysian ringgit. B,  Indonesian rupiah, Philippine 
peso, and Thai baht. Logarithmic change in basis points. 
of price stability in Singapore’s exchange rate policy, hence the greater resis- 
tance to exchange rate depreciation and the greater propensity to accommodate 
the yen’s exchange rate appreciation. 
7.6.3  Malaysia 
On a daily basis, Malaysia’s policy response was quite asymmetric with re- 
spect to the yen’s depreciation and appreciation. When the yen appreciated in 
March 1995, the nominal value of  the ringgit remained extremely stable for 204  Shiqji Takagi 
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Fig. 7.4  Daily movements of selected Asian currencies against the U.S. dollar 
during the period of sharp yen depreciation 1 August to 19 September 1995 
Nore: A, Korean won, Singapore dollar, and Malaysian ringgit. B, Indonesian rupiah, Philippine 
peso, and Thai baht. Logarithmic change in basis points. 
most of the period, although it began to appreciate moderately against the U.S. 
dollar during the very last part of the yen's  appreciation phase. When the yen 
depreciated in August, however, the ringgit depreciated immediately against 
the U.S. dollar so as to offset a portion of its appreciation against the yen. 
7.6.4  Indonesia 
The nominal value of the Indonesian rupiah remained fairly constant against 
the U.S. dollar on both occasions. In fact, it continued to depreciate against the 205  The  Yen and Its East Asian Neighbors, 1980-1995 
U.S. dollar at a moderate pace regardless of the movement of the yen against 
the dollar. 
7.6.5  Philippines 
The behavior of the Philippine peso was similar to that of the Indonesian 
rupiah. Regardless of  how the yen  moved against the U.S. dollar, the peso 
remained on a moderately depreciating trend against the dollar. 
7.6.6  Thailand 
The Thai baht’s movement was symmetrical with respect to the yen’s  ap- 
preciation and depreciation. In both cases, the baht moved  so as to offset a 
portion of its movement against the yen, indicative of the policy of  the Thai 
authorities to peg the baht fairly strictly to a currency basket, of which the yen 
is a component. Judging from the movement of foreign exchange reserves (not 
reported here), it is most likely that the Thai authorities sold foreign exchange 
in the market during the period of yen appreciation (so as to appreciate the 
baht), while they purchased foreign exchange during the period of yen depreci- 
ation (so as to depreciate the baht). 
7.7  Conclusion 
By looking at how six East Asian currencies moved when the yen fluctuated 
sharply against the U.S. dollar during 1980-95, we have found that the reaction 
was sometimes much more significant than would be suggested by the econo- 
metric estimates of the yen’s weight in the determination of their nominal val- 
ues. When the individual episodes of sharp yen fluctuation were examined, the 
“weight” of the yen often appeared larger than most of the econometric esti- 
mates taken from a longer sample period. The exceptions were the Indonesian 
rupiah and the Philippine peso, both of  which showed secular depreciation 
against the U.S. dollar over the period. Clearly, the paramount objective of the 
Indonesian and Philippine exchange rate policies was to prevent a real appreci- 
ation of their currencies in the light of higher domestic inflation by consistently 
depreciating their currencies in nominal terms. In these countries, little atten- 
tion was paid to the movement of the yen, although it is evident that the yen is 
prominently included in the real effective exchange rate indexes. 
Except for Thailand, which strictly adheres to a basket peg, the other coun- 
tries have more recently shown asymmetric responses to the yen’s depreciation 
and appreciation. The Singapore dollar has tended to move more closely with 
an appreciating yen, underscoring the importance the authorities attach to price 
stability in their exchange rate policy. On the other hand, the Korean won and 
the Malaysian ringgit have tended to move more closely with a depreciating 
yen, suggesting an emphasis on export promotion. In this sense, the yen  is 206  Shinji Takagi 
perceived in Korea and Malaysia as the currency of a competitor country in 
the export market.7 
In contrast to Korea, which has demonstratively become Japan’s competitor 
in the world market for manufactures, the case for Malaysia as a competitor of 
Japan may sound a little farfetched. To be sure, Malaysia’s manufacturing ex- 
ports are not as voluminous as Korean exports, nor do they compete as directly 
with Japanese exports. In terms of growth in recent years, however, Malaysia 
has considerably raised its status as an exporter of  manufactured goods. For 
example, from 1989 to 1994, Malaysia’s export of Sections 6 and 7 manufac- 
tured goods (as classified by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development [OECD]) to the United States increased fourfold from $3 billion 
to $12 billion, while Japan only marginally increased its export of  similar 
goods from $91 billion to $112 billion during the same period (OECD 1994). 
It is thus possible that in tying the currency more to a depreciating yen, the 
Malaysian authorities were protecting the gains being made in manufacturing 
exports. 
Emphasis on export promotion produces more convergent movement with 
a depreciating yen  and more divergent movement with an appreciating yen. 
Conversely, emphasis on price stability produces more convergent movement 
with an appreciating yen  and more divergent movement with a depreciating 
yen. As things have turned out, because the yen showed sustained and signifi- 
cant appreciation against the U.S. dollar for the sample period as a whole, an 
exchange rate policy targeted at price stability has contributed more to mone- 
tary cooperation in Asia, by promoting intraregional exchange rate stability, 
than a more competitive exchange rate policy targeted at export promotion. 
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Comment  Tetsuji Okazaki 
Since Frankel and Wei’s pioneering paper of  1994, currency blocs have come 
to be a subject of  quantitative research. Takagi’s paper joins this line of re- 
search and makes a new contribution. He pays attention to the movements of 
the exchange rates of selected Asian countries in cases when the yen fluctuated 
sharply against the U.S. dollar. He takes up twelve cases of large yen fluctua- 
tion against the dollar from 1982 to 1995, of which eight were yen appreciation 
and four were yen depreciation. The main finding of the paper is that the ex- 
change rates of some countries responded to sharp yen fluctuations asymmetri- 
cally between the cases of depreciation and appreciation. That is, the exchange 
rates of the Korean won and the Malaysian ringgit moved more in line with the 
yen against the U.S. dollar when the yen depreciated than when it appreciated. 
On the other hand, the exchange rate of the Singapore dollar moved more in 
line with the yen against the U.S. dollar when the yen appreciated than when 
it depreciated. Takagi interprets this asymmetry as reflecting the policy of each 
currency authority. The Korean and Malaysian authorities regard the yen as the 
currency of  a competitor country, while the authority of  Singapore makes 
much of stability of prices. The asymmetrical responses of the exchange rates 
are phenomena that have not been given much attention in the research since 
the Frankel and Wei paper, and this finding is a substantial contribution. 
However, there remains some room for consideration in the author’s inter- 
pretation of  the asymmetry, because we can derive another implication from 
table 7.4 in the paper. In table 7.4 he takes the U.S. dollar as numkraire. If we 
take the yen as numkraire in this table, we can say that the exchange rates of 
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the Korean won and Malaysian ringgit moved more in line with the U.S. dollar 
against the yen when the U.S. dollar depreciated than when it appreciated. Also 
we can say that the exchange rate of the Singapore dollar moved more in line 
with the U.S. dollar against the yen when the U.S.  dollar appreciated than when 
it depreciated. In sum, the Korean and Malaysian authorities are inclined to 
depreciate their currencies in both the case of yen depreciation against the U.S. 
dollar and the case of U.S. dollar depreciation against the yen. And the Singa- 
pore authority is reluctant to depreciate its currency in both the case of  yen 
depreciation against the U.S. dollar and the case of  U.S. dollar depreciation 
against the yen. Therefore, it is true that the Singapore authority places more 
importance on price stability. On the other hand, the Korean and Malaysian 
authorities’ responses shown in table 7.4  might not be due to their perception 
of Japan as a competitor country but might reflect a more general policy of ex- 
port orientation. 
Takagi further interprets the asymmetrical responses as revealing different 
roles of the yen with respect to each currency, that is, competition and coopera- 
tion, which is the subtitle of his paper. Aside from the above-mentioned prob- 
lem, the asymmetry can be interpreted as reflecting the relationship between 
the industries of Japan and those of each Asian country. For example, the lead- 
ing industries of  Korea and Japan are substitutive, while those of Singapore 
and Japan are complementary. However, there is some distance between the 
relationship of the industries of the two countries and the relationship of their 
currencies. 
Comment  K. c.  Fung 
I find this paper very interesting. It takes another look at how much currencies 
of  some Asian countries (South Korea, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, the 
Philippines, and Thailand) respond to changes in the Japanese yen  and the 
U.S. dollar. The contribution of the paper is its focus on the reactions of these 
currencies during episodes when the yen moved sharply against the U.S. dollar. 
The paper also examines movements of the Asian currencies both when the 
yen depreciates and when the yen appreciates against the U.S. dollar. 
I think one important motivation for focusing on episodes of large exchange 
rate changes is that large fluctuations of the yen can have persistent effects on 
these Asian economies (Baldwin and Krugman 1986). Confronted by possible 
long-term effects, the central banks of these countries may feel that they have 
no choice but to reveal, clarify, and pursue their objectives through their ex- 
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change rate policies. The paper shows that some currencies (such as the South 
Korean won) behaved quite differently when the yen appreciated as compared 
to when the yen depreciated. This asymmetric behavior gives us additional in- 
sight into the goals of the exchange rate policies of these countries. 
By and large, I interpret the results of the paper to be consistent with earlier 
studies that show that currencies of East Asian countries (other than Japan) are 
pegged de facto to the U.S. dollar and with few exceptions place little weight 
on the role of  the Japanese yen. In addition to the work by Frankel and Wei 
(1994) cited in the paper, Ito (1994), for example, found evidence that while 
countries in Asia are gradually expanding their use of the yen as an invoice 
currency, most still rely mainly on the U.S.  dollar. In fact, it was pointed out 
that in invoicing import and export transactions, other developed countries use 
their own national currencies far more than Japan uses the yen. 
The de facto pegging of the Asian currencies to the U.S. dollar may reflect 
the underlying choices that these governments and their central banks had to 
make. Since 1985, two events put pressure on real exchange rates to appreciate 
in Asia. First, between  1985 and  1987, the U.S.  dollar sharply depreciated 
against major currencies, including the Japanese yen and the German deutsche 
mark. This improved the export competitiveness of  these Asian economies, 
which led to large increases in their trade balances. Second, U.S. interest rates 
declined between 1989 and 1993. This encouraged capital to flow to regions 
like Asia. 
Faced with these conditions, governments could have allowed their nominal 
exchange rates to appreciate, which would have reduced exports, or they could 
have taken measures to maintain their nominal exchange rates, which would 
have led to more inflation. Basically, most of the Asian governments chose to 
pay attention to their export competitiveness. Because their major export mar- 
ket is the United States, these governments took steps to avoid sharp appreci- 
ation of  their nominal exchange rates against the  U.S. dollar. The choice 
between export competitiveness and inflation facing these economies is illus- 
trated by the different strategies pursued by the Hong Kong and Singaporean 
governments. Hong Kong apparently is more interested in its export competi- 
tiveness. The Hong Kong dollar has been pegged to the U.S. dollar, and since 
1985 it has had cumulative inflation of more than 50 percent relative to that in 
the United States. In contrast, Singapore seems to be more concerned with 
inflation. The government of  Singapore allowed its nominal exchange rate to 
go up by about 50 percent against the U.S. dollar. Since 1985, cumulative in- 
flation has been 20 percent lower than in the United States (Glick and Mor- 
eno 1995). 
The paper also highlights an interesting micro question about the use of 
currency in international trade. The question is: as East Asia conducts more 
trade with Japan, why do we not see any significant increase in the use of the 
Japanese yen? Part of the answer may  lie in the nature and the character of 
trade rather than just the total volume of trade. In an earlier NBER-East  Asia 210  Shinji Takagi 
Seminar study, Urata (1993) documented that a significant fraction of  East 
Asia-Japan  trade is intrafirm trade and that Japanese affiliates in East Asia tend 
to export a large share of their final goods to the U.S. market. Since it has been 
documented that Japanese firms continue to conduct their international trade 
in U.S. dollars (It0 1994), it should not be surprising that even as the volume 
of trade with Japan increases, the use of the Japanese yen in East Asia does not 
proportionally expand. 
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